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Abstract
Understanding religion requires explaining why supernatu-
ral beliefs, devotions, and rituals are both universal and vari- 20
able across cultures, and why religion is so often associated
with both large-scale cooperation and enduring group conﬂict.
Emerging lines of research suggest that these oppositions result
from the convergence of three processes. First, the interaction
of certain reliably developing cognitive processes, such as our 25
ability to infer the presence of intentional agents, favors—as
an evolutionary by-product—the spread of certain kinds of
counterintuitive concepts. Second, participation in rituals and
devotions involving costly displays exploits various aspects
of our evolved psychology to deepen people’s commitment 30
to both supernatural agents and religious communities. Third,
competition among societies and organizations with different
faith-based beliefs and practices has increasingly connected re-
ligion with both within-group prosociality and between-group
enmity. This connection has strengthened dramatically in re- 35
cent millennia, as part of the evolution of complex societies,
and is important to understanding cooperation and conﬂict in
today’s world.
Keywords
by-product hypothesis, credibility enhancing displays, cultural 40
transmission, cooperation, group competition, high gods, min-
imally counterintuitive, morality, religion, rise of civilization
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[An] advancement in the standard of morality and an increase in
the number of well-endowed men . . . who, from possessing in a high
degree the spirit of patriotism, ﬁdelity, obedience, courage, and sym-45
pathy, were always ready to give aid to each other and to sacriﬁce
themselves for the common good, would be victorious over other
tribes.
— Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man
This synthesis integrates insights from studies of the cogni-50
tive foundations of religion with evolutionary approaches to
human cooperation to derive a deeper understanding of the ori-
gin and development of prosocial religions. We argue that the
cultural evolution of prosocial religions and the historical rise
of large-scale civilizations involve the dynamic interaction of55
the by-products of adaptive cognitive mechanisms (e.g., min-
imally counterintuitive beliefs and overextended agent con-
cepts), adaptive learning heuristics (e.g., emulation of suc-
cessful and prestigious individuals), credibility-enhancing rit-
ual displays (e.g., self-sacriﬁce and costly commitments to60
seemingly preposterous beliefs), and cultural group selection
for those packages of rituals, devotions, and beliefs that best
sustain in-group prosocial norms (e.g., monumental undertak-
ings, sacred values).
Many religions pose an evolutionary enigma because they65
require costly commitments to beliefs that violate both core
aspects of logical consistency and our intuitive expectations
about how theworldworks, both ofwhich are otherwise crucial
for successfully navigating the world (Atran and Norenzayan
2004). Religious practices are often costly in terms of material70
sacriﬁce (ranging from human sacriﬁce to prayer time), emo-
tional expenditure (inciting fears and hopes), and cognitive
effort (maintaining conﬂicting models about the nature of the
world). One anthropological review of religious offerings con-
cludes: “Sacriﬁce is giving something up at a cost. . . . ‘Afford75
it or not,’ the attitude seems to be” (Firth 1963).
At the same time, the origin of large-scale cooperative
human societies is also an evolutionary puzzle because people
frequently cooperate and trade with non-relatives in ephemeral
interactions (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003). Thus, while the evo-80
lutionarymechanisms associatedwith kinship, reciprocity, and
reputation clearly inﬂuence cooperation in important ways,
they do not capture the fullest extent of human prosocial-
ity. Kinship cannot explain cooperation among non-relatives
(Henrich and Henrich 2007), though “ﬁctive kinship”—a cul-85
tural manipulation of kin psychology—may contribute to mo-
bilizing larger groups (Johnson 1987;Atran 2003). Reciprocity
does not sufﬁce to explain cooperation beyond dense so-
cial networks, small villages, or tightly knit neighborhoods
(Hruschka and Henrich 2006; Allen-Arave et al. 2008; Atran90
2010). Neither direct nor indirect reciprocity can explain coop-
eration in transient interactions in large populations, because
reputational information rapidly degrades as a function of pop-
ulation size, or in large-group interactions such as those asso-
ciated with many kinds of public goods or common dilemmas 95
(Boyd and Richerson 1988; Panchanathan and Boyd 2003;
Nowak and Sigmund 2005; Mathew and Boyd 2009). Even
more telling is that none of these mechanisms explains the
variation in cooperation among human societies, or the mas-
sive expansion of cooperation in some societies over last 10 100
millennia (Henrich et al. 2005).
Converging lines of ﬁeld and experimental evidence sug-
gest that cultural evolution, building on certain innate cognitive
foundations, has favored the emergence of beliefs in power-
ful moralizing deities concerned with the prosocial behav- 105
ior of individuals beyond kin- and reciprocity-based networks
(Norenzayan and Shariff 2008). Cross-cultural analysis of 186
societies has found that larger and more complex societies
were much more likely to subscribe to potent deities directly
concerned with morality and willing to punish norm violators 110
(Roes and Raymond 2003; Johnson 2005). Studies conducted
across a diverse range of societies including foragers, farm-
ers, and herders, show that professing a world religion pre-
dicts greater fairness toward ephemeral interactants (Henrich
et al. 2010). Experiments with North Americans show that 115
unconsciously activating religious concepts lead to reduced
cheating and greater generosity toward strangers (Bargh and
Chartrand 1999; Mazar and Ariely 2006; Shariff and Noren-
zayan 2007), except among ardent atheists. Together, these
cross-cultural, historical, and experimental ﬁndings suggest 120
that (1) religion—as a phenomenon with potentially deep
roots (Klein 1989)—has not always been about high mor-
alizing gods and (2) modern world religions may have evolved
to create a potent linkage between the supernatural and the
prosocial. Thus, we hypothesize that cultural evolutionary pro- 125
cesses, driven by competition among groups, have exploited
aspects of our evolved psychology, including certain cognitive
by-products, to gradually assemble packages of supernatural
beliefs, devotions, and rituals that were increasingly effective
at instilling deep commitment, galvanizing internal solidarity, 130
and sustaining larger-scale cooperation.
Ordinary Cognition Produces Extraordinary Agents
Humans are purpose-seeking, cause-inferring, story-telling an-
imals (Gazzaniga et al. 2009). As Hume noted in The Natural
History of Religion, the greater the impact of events on our 135
lives, the greater is our drive to impose purpose and coherence
on those events. This view is backed by a recent experiment
in which people were asked what patterns they could see in
arrangements of dots or stock market ﬁgures (Whitson and
Galinsky 2008). Before asking, the experimenters made half 140
the participants feel a lack of control. Those who experienced
a lack of control were more likely to see patterns and processes
underlying the randomness, suggesting that under uncertainty
2 Biological Theory 5(1) 2010
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we are more likely to ﬁnd preternatural explanations for the
randomness. Both cross-cultural experiments and surveys in-145
dicate that people more readily ascribe to the veracity of nar-
ratives containing counterintuitive elements (e.g., miracles)
when primed with death (Norenzayan and Hansen 2006), or
when facing danger or insecurity, as with pleas of hope for
God’s intervention during wartime (Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi150
2000). Such ﬁndings help explain both cross-national analyses
showing that a country’s religiosity (devotion to a world reli-
gion) is positively related to its degree of existential insecurity
(Norris and Inglehart 2004), and why certain kinds of religions
enjoy revivals in challenging times. The issue then becomes:155
how and why does purpose-seeking and cause-inferring so
often deliver supernatural agents?
Religious traditions center on supernatural agents, such as
gods, angels, or ancestor spirits. This includes religions such
as Buddhism and Taoism, which doctrinally eschew personi-160
fying the supernatural, but whose adherents routinely worship
an array of deities that behave in ways that violate our intuitive
expectations about how the world works (Pyysia¨inen 2003).
Mundane agent concepts are central players in what psychol-
ogists refer to as folkpsychology, associated with a Theory of165
Mind module(s) (ToM), which is a cognitive system devoted
to making inferences about the beliefs, desires, and intentions
of other minds (Baron-Cohen 1995). Recent functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies conﬁrm that people’s
statements about God’s involvement in social events, as well as170
the deity’s purported emotional states, reliably engage ToM-
related regions of the brain (Kapogiannis et al. 2009).
Agent concepts may be hair-trigger in our cognitive pro-
cessing, allowing us to readily respond under uncertainty to
potential threats by intelligent predators (Guthrie 1993). From175
this evolutionary vantage, agent’s proper evolutionary domain
encompasses animate species, but its actual domain inadver-
tently extends to moving dots on computer screens, voices
in the wind, faces in clouds, complicated contrivances like
eyes, and virtually any complex design or uncertain circum-180
stance of unknown origin (Sperber 1996). Children and adults
spontaneously interpret the contingent movements of dots and
geometrical forms on a screen as interacting agents with dis-
tinct goals and internal goal-directed motivations (Heider and
Simmel 1944; Bloom and Veres 1999; Csibra et al. 1999).185
Young children spontaneously overattribute agency to all sorts
of entities (clouds, computers), and may thus be predisposed
to construct agent-based representations of many phenom-
ena (Keleman 2004). Such reliably developing programs pro-
vide efﬁcient reactions to a wide—but not unlimited—range190
of stimuli that would have been statistically associated with
the presence of dangerous agents in ancestral environments.
Mistakes, or “false positives,” would usually carry little cost,
whereas a true response could provide the margin of survival.
This reactive bias was likely adaptive, at least until supernat-195
ural agents were harnessed by cultural evolution to begin de-
manding costly actions and cooperation, under threat of divine
punishment or offers of sublime rewards.
How do our mindsmake agent concepts into gods? Cogni-
tive approaches propose that supernatural concepts exploit or- 200
dinary mental processes to construct counterintuitive concepts
(Boyer 2001; Atran 2002; Barrett 2004). Religious beliefs are
counterintuitive because they violate universal expectations
about the world’s mundane structure. This includes the ba-
sic categories of our “intuitive ontology” (i.e., the ontology 205
of our semantic system), such as person, animal, plant, and
substance (Whythe 1993; Sperber et al. 1995). Experimental
studies reveal that children across cultures do not violate such
categorical constraints in learning wordmeaning; for example,
people cannot literallymelt, and neither can animals joke, trees 210
walk, nor rocks tire (Keil 1979). Experiments with Americans
and Indians illustrate a gap between religious utterances and
the mental processing of religious concepts (Barrett and Keil
1996; Barrett 1998). When asked to describe their deities, sub-
jects produced abstract theological descriptions of gods that 215
are able to (1) do anything, including anticipating and reacting
to everything all at once, (2) know the right thing to do, and
(3) dispense entirely with perceptual information and calcu-
lation. However, when asked to respond to narratives about
these same gods, people interpreted their deities as being in 220
only one place at a time, puzzling over alternative actions, and
looking for evidence to make a decision. In short, people men-
tally represent gods using our intuitive ontology, so abstract
theological propositions give little insight into how people ac-
tually think about supernatural agents (Malley 2004). Much 225
recent work suggests this intuitive ontology results from, or
interacts with, certain universal modes of causal construal,
including folkmechanics (object cohesion, contact, and con-
tinuity in movement), folkbiology (teleological development
of species-like essences and relations), and folkpsychology 230
(intentional, goal-directed, interactive agents).
Most religious beliefs minimally violate the expectations
created by our intuitive ontology and these modes of con-
strual, thus creating cognitively manageable and memorable
supernatural worlds. For example, agents that resemble us 235
emotionally, intellectually, and physically except that they can
move through solid objects and live forever (angels, ghosts,
and spirits) ﬁt the bill. Table 1 provides examples of minimal
violations.
Cognitive approaches hypothesize that although intuitive 240
concepts transmit well, concepts that minimally deviate from
intuition transmit better, while those that deviate greatly can-
not transmit successfully because they overload cognitive pro-
cesses that drive inferential reasoning and relevance (Atran and
Sperber 1991). Invisible statues that cry exist in two places at 245
once and get hungry only on leap years are not easy to enter-
tain. Minimally counterintuitive concepts are remembered and
Biological Theory 5(1) 2010 3
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Table 1. Mundane relations between universal categories and modes of reasoning. Changing any one cell (+ to − or – to +) yields a minimal counterintuition.
Thus, switching the cell (− folkpsychology, substance) to (+ folkpsychology, substance) yields a thinking talisman; switching (+ folkpsychology, person) to
(− folkpsychology, person) yields a zombie (Barrett 2000; Atran and Norenzayan 2004).
Belief Domains (and Associated Properties)
Folkmechanics Folkbiology Folkpsychology
Semantic
Categories
Inert Vegetative Animate Psycho–Physical, e.g.,
Hunger, Fatigue, etc.
Epistemic, e.g.,
Belief, Desire, etc.
Person + + + + +
Animal + + + + −
Plant + + − − −
Substance + − − − −
retransmitted more readily than either intuitive or highly coun-
terintuitive concepts. Recall experiments indicate that mini-
mally counterintuitive concepts and beliefs enjoy a cognitive250
advantage in memory and transmission over intuitive concepts
and mundane beliefs (Barrett and Nyhof 2001). Results have
been observed immediately, as well as after a three-month de-
lay, in samples from the United States, France, Gabon, Nepal
(Boyer and Ramble 2001), as well as from Maya (Atran and255
Norenzayan 2004). Whether counterintuitive concepts are be-
lieved in, or committed to, more is another matter (think Jesus
vs. Zeus), which is addressed below (also see Gervais and
Henrich forthcoming).AQ1
The advantages inmnemonic and transmittability formin-260
imally counterintuitive representations beg the question ofwhy
such representations don’t occupy most of scriptures, folk-
tales, and myths. The Bible or the Koran, for example, involve
successions of mundane events—walking, eating, sleeping,
marrying, ﬁghting, and suffering—interspersed with a few265
counterintuitive occurrences, often involving miracles or the
appearance of supernatural agents. One explanation is that
counterintuitive ideas are transmitted as elements in narra-
tive structures. Studies have explored this by examining (1)
the cognitive structure of folktales, and (2) the relative cul-270
tural success of each tale (Norenzayan et al. 2006). Minimally
counterintuitive folktales (containing two to three supernatu-
ral events or objects) were substantially more widespread than
folktales containing fewer counterintuitive elements (less than
two) or those with too many counterintuitive elements (more275
than three).
In brief, counterintuitive concepts and beliefs, as long as
they come in small doses, help people remember and pre-
sumably retransmit the intuitive statements, as well as the
underlying knowledge that can be inferred from them. A280
small proportion of minimally counterintuitive elements give
a story a mnemonic advantage over stories with no or too
many counterintuitive elements. This dual aspect of super-
natural belief sets—commonsensical and counterintuitive—
renders them intuitively compelling yet fantastic, eminently 285
recognizable but surprising. Cross-cultural experiments indi-
cate that such beliefs grab attention, activate intuition,mobilize
inference, and can accommodate seemingly contrary events
and interpretations, in ways that facilitate their mnemonic re-
tention, cultural transmission, and historical survival. 290
Natural Origins of Faith
The above helps explain the success of, for example, folktales
and scriptures. However, this approach misses the difference
between Moses’ miracles and Mickey Mouse’s antics (Atran
1998). Or, why the faithfuls of one religion do not adopt be- 295
liefs in the gods of other religions once they learn about them
(Gervais and Henrich forthcoming). So, the question is why AQ2
do people become deeply committed to particular counterin-
tuitive agents or stories—so committed that they would die for
their beliefs? 300
We are a cultural species. Unlike other animals, humans
have evolved to rely heavily on acquiring behavior, beliefs,
motivations, and strategies from others in their group. These
psychological processes, shaped by natural selection, focus
our attention on both those domains and individuals that likely 305
to possess ﬁtness-enhancing information (Henrich and Gil-
White 2001; Richerson and Boyd 2005). Human social learn-
ing generates vast bodies of know-how and complex prac-
tices that accumulate and improve over generations. Studies
of small-scale societies show that survival and reproduction 310
are dependent on cumulative bodies of information related to
hunting (animal behavior), edible plants (seasonality, toxic-
ity, etc.), medical knowledge, technical manufacture, and so
on (Liebenberg 1990; Henrich and McElreath 2003; Henrich
2008). 315
Because of the dependence that human ancestors increas-
ingly had to place on such complex, often nonintuitive, prod-
ucts of cumulative cultural evolution, natural selection may
have favored a willingness to rely on culturally acquired
4 Biological Theory 5(1) 2010
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information—ﬁltered through our adaptive biases—over our320
direct experience or basic intuitions. To see this, consider that
many foragers process plant foods to remove toxins with-
out conscious knowledge of what happens without processing
(Beck 1992). Such foods often contain low dosages of toxins
that cause little harm for months or even years, and don’t badly325
damage the food’s ﬂavor. However, such toxins will accumu-
late and eventually cause severe health problems and death. A
naı¨ve learnerwho favors his own experience of eating the foods
without the arduous processing will do less work in the short
run, but possibly die in the long run. Place faith in traditional330
practices, without understanding why, can be adaptive. Simi-
larly, manufacturing complex technologies or medicines often
involve a sequence of important steps, most of which cannot be
skipped without producing an inferior outcome. Experimenta-
tion is of limited use in rearranging or dropping steps because335
even a relatively small number of steps yield a combinatorial
explosion of possible alternative procedures. Learners must
have faith, and copy all steps. This suggests that a willingness
to sometimes rely on faith—to believe in cultural traditions
over experience or intuitions—is likely a product of evolving340
in a world with complex cultural adaptations.
Supporting evidence comes from developmental psychol-
ogy, which documents a potent tendency for “over-imitation”
in children, and recently demonstrated how deeply over-
imitation inﬂuences our acquisition and encoding of concepts345
(Lyons et al. 2007). This comes across most starkly in stud-
ies comparing children and chimpanzees. When both species
observe demonstrations of a task involvingmultiple steps, chil-
dren accurately copy all steps, including steps that direct visual
inspection and are unnecessary. Chimpanzees do some copy-350
ing, but skip unnecessary steps, leading them to more efﬁcient
repertoires than children (Horner and Whiten 2005). Children
implicitly assume that if the model performed a seemingly
unnecessary action, it was probably important, even if they
cannot understand precisely why.355
With the evolution of language, this faith in cultur-
ally transmitted information became vulnerable to exploita-
tion by individuals—particularly successful and prestigious
individuals—able to transmit practices or beliefs they them-
selves might not hold. Language makes exaggeration, dis-360
tortion, manipulation, and deception easy and cheap. Before
language, learners observed and inferred people’s underlying
beliefs or desires by their behavior. Those wishing to deceive
would have to actually perform an action to transmit it. To
avoid being manipulated by models proﬁcient at altering or365
exaggerating commitments to certain beliefs, evolutionary ap-
proaches suggest that humans may have evolved cognitive
abilities that examine the ﬁt between a model’s words (ex-
pressed beliefs) and actions. In ﬁguring out who to learn from,
learners consider both a model’s cues of success, skill, and370
prestige (among other cues) and whether a models’ expressed
beliefs are supported by diagnostic actions that permit an as-
sessment of the model’s underlying degree of commitment
to their expressed beliefs. For example, if a potential model
rails against prostitution, but then uses prostitutes for his own 375
clandestine recreation, a learner should de-weight this model’s
inﬂuence in cultural transmission with regard to prosecuting
prostitution. This means that if a model’s belief causes him to
perform “costly displays”—that is, actions that would be too
costly for someone with different beliefs to perform—learners 380
should be more willing to learn from this model. If a model is
successful or prestigious in the eyes of learners, and performs
costly displays cueing deep commitment to his expressed be-
liefs, then learners shouldmore readily adopt and believe in (be
committed to) the models’ expressed beliefs (Henrich 2009). 385
Experimental ﬁndings support this. Thus, young children
are generally unwilling to sample a novel food offered by a
stranger as “something to eat” without ﬁrst seeing the stranger
eat it (Harper and Sanders 1975). Developmental studies of the
transmission of altruistic giving show that neither preaching 390
nor exhortation to charity is effective without opportunities to
observe costly giving by models (Henrich and Henrich 2007).
Studies of children’s beliefs about the existence of entities like
intangible germs, angels, and mermaids show that children
only subscribe to those agents whom adults seem to endorse 395
through their daily actions, and remain skeptical of unendorsed
supernatural agents (Harris et al. 2006). Similarly, interviews
with a diverse sample of parents from highly religious Chris-
tian, Jewish, Mormon, and Muslim families reveal that parents
see religion holding their children on a virtuous life course pri- 400
marily because of their costly investments in “practicing (and
parenting) what you preach” (Marks 2004).
This suggests an approach to devotions (fasting, celibacy,
etc.) and rituals as having evolved culturally (at least in part)
to deepen people’s commitments to counterintuitive beliefs. 405
Counterintuitive beliefs have a mnemonic advantage, but not
a belief advantage. Both direct experience and our own intu-
itions often contradict counterintuitive beliefs, and reality does
not readily provide decisive evidence in their favor. (There
are many potentially counterintuitive beliefs that can be em- 410
pirically grounded through arduous scientiﬁc effort—think
quantum teleportation, evolution, etc.—but common sense and
experience doesn’t favor even these beliefs.) This puts coun-
terintuitives at a disadvantage relative to mundane or intuitive
beliefs. Rituals and devotions can help overcome this disad- 415
vantage through acts of costly commitment (Henrich 2009).
In this view, costly ritual or devotional acts may have
evolved as a means to convince learners of the personal com-
mitment of either the rest of the congregation (exploiting con-
formist biases in our learning) or of locally prestigious models 420
(Henrich 2009). Rituals and devotions exploit our reliance
on diagnostic actions to deepen commitment to counterin-
tuitive beliefs. They also link performance of costly acts to
Biological Theory 5(1) 2010 5
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social success, thereby perpetuating the transmission of belief–
commitment across generations. Formal cultural evolutionary425
models show that costly displays (e.g., ritual sacriﬁce) can in-
terlock with and sustain counterintuitive beliefs, which would
not be otherwise sustained by cultural evolution. By contrast,
fairy tales are counterintuitive, easily remembered, and may
help to transmit moral messages by grabbing attention with430
themes having emotional impact; but nothing is socially im-
perative or sacred about them or their message. No one in the
learner’s community demonstrates via costly acts their deep
commitment to the truth of such stories, actors, or ideas.
Because of our adaptive need, at times, to rely wholly435
on cultural information in the face of inconsistent experience
or contradictory implications, natural selection likely favored
something of a psychological immune system that cements
adherence to adopted beliefs. Experiments suggest that once
people sincerely commit to religious beliefs, attempts to un-440
dermine them through reason and evidence can stimulate the
strengthening of personal commitments (Festinger et al. 1956).
Since many religious beliefs are logically inscrutable and im-
mune to empirical falsiﬁcation, a failed prophecy (direct evi-
dence) may mean that more introspection and commitment is445
needed.
These lines of reasoning and evidence suggest that com-
mitment to supernatural agents tends to spread in a population
to the extent it elicits costly displays, usually in the form of
ritual ceremonies, offerings, devotions, and sacriﬁces. When450
community leaders and congregations demonstrate commit-
ment to supernatural beliefs in costly rites, observers who
witness these commitments are more inclined to trust and fol-
lowparticipants. Such trust and following often extend towider
sets ofmundane beliefs and associated actions because (1) peo-455
ple tend to follow, and give the beneﬁt of doubt to, models with
proven success and commitment in one valued domain as they
move into other domains (hence, advertisers get famous peo-
ple to sell their wares) (Henrich and Gil-White 2001); and (2)
many counterintuitive beliefs violate our intuitive ontology,460
and are thus literally preposterous (like many poetic tropes);
they can only be meaningfully interpreted in terms exogenous
to the beliefs themselves. Consequently, religious trust and
following carry over to other beliefs and actions associated
with ritualized actions, including cooperative works, charity,465
commerce, moral norms, and warfare.
Supernatural agents that incentivize costly sacriﬁces will
tend to spread, creating an emerging linkage between degree
of commitment to belief and costly displays. For example,
alongside prohibitions against various social ills (e.g., murder,470
adultery, and theft), God commanded the Israelites to keep holy
the Sabbath or suffer death. Demands for rituals, devotions,
and sacriﬁces guarantee intergenerational transmission of deep
commitments (Alcorta and Sosis 2005), as children infer deep
commitment from costly actions of adults (Henrich 2009).475
Because the deeply committed actually believe in the agent’s
incentives, sacriﬁces and rituals needn’t seem (subjectively)
costly.
Religions have culturally evolved to deploy a variety of
other means to ratchet up faith and commitment. Faith in 480
otherwise inscrutable content is deepened and validated by
communion: collectively engaging emotions and motivations
using music, rhythm, and synchrony. Of people reporting a
religious experience, music is the single most important elic-
itor of the experience, followed by prayer and group services 485
(Greeley 1975). Listeners as young as three years old reli-
ably associate basic emotions—anger, sadness, fear, joy—with
musical structures (Trainor and Trehub 1992). Recent study
ﬁnds that strangers acting in synchrony—marching, singing,
and dancing—cooperate more in subsequent group exercises, 490
even in situations requiring personal sacriﬁce. Synchronous ac-
tion (rhythmically moving together) increases cooperation by
strengthening social bonds among group members, even when
no positive emotion is attached to the movement (Wiltermuth
and Heath 2009). The ability of music, rhythm, and synchrony 495
to instill commitment and trust is also apparent why military
drills and routines developed over the centuries to train soldiers
and build armies (McNeil 1982).
This indicates that groups and institutions that survive and
spread will possess both costly displays (devotions and rituals) 500
of commitment and values that glorify such sacriﬁces for group
beliefs. The Navajo, for example, are among the most success-
ful cooperators and survivors of Native American groups, with
men spending upwards of one-third, and women one-ﬁfth,
of their productive time on “priestly rites” (Kluckholn and 505
Leighton 1946). Historical studies suggest that early Chris-
tianity spread to become the majority religion in the Roman
Empire through costly displays such as martyrdom and char-
ity (e.g., risking death by caring for sick non-Christians during
epidemics; Stark 1997). Strengthening the group through rit- 510
ual participation and costly displays also applies to a variety
of modern movements for civil and human rights that grow
by “waging peace” in the battle for public opinion, including
those modeled on the nonviolent doctrines and costly commit-
ments (imprisonment, harassment, etc.) of Gandhi and M. L. 515
King (Smith 1996). Martyring spiritual leaders often stimu-
lates the spread of their ideas by providing persuasive displays
of the leader’s deep commitment.
Below, we sketch a cultural evolutionary process that as-
sembles these otherwise disparate elements into a general ac- 520
count of the evolution of religions.
Coevolution of Counterintuitive Beliefs and Norms
for Complex Societies
Counterintuitive beliefs are readily recalled and retransmit-
ted. Rituals and devotions involving costly displays, music, 525
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rhythm, and synchrony can ratchet up the belief in, and com-
mitment to, these counterintuitive beliefs. Now, the questions
are (1) how do these elements of effective rituals and devotions
get assembled and linked with particular supernatural agents?;
(2) why do these supernatural agents so favor prosocial behav-530
ior, by forbidding stealing, lying, murdering, adultery, and so
forth?; and (3) why does this seem more prevalent in recent
and increasingly large and complex societies? A rising tide
of evidence suggests that religious beliefs, rituals, devotions,
and social norms have coevolved in interlocking cultural com-535
plexes in a process driven by competition among alternative
complexes.
As a species we rely heavily on acquiring key aspects
of our behavior by observing others. Humans readily acquire
social strategies, practices, beliefs, and preferences via cul-540
tural learning inways consistent with evolutionary predictions.AQ3
Children acquire altruistic behaviors or other costly norms
via observation and inference, and will spontaneously apply
imitated standards to others, sanctioning them if necessary
(Henrich and Henrich 2007; Rakoczy et al. 2008). Game the-545
oretic analyses show that when cultural learning is combined
with social interaction, a variety of different stable states (i.e.,
social norms or institutions) emerge. Unlike genetic transmis-
sion, this is even true in larger scale cooperative endeavors
(Henrich and Boyd 2001; Panchanathan and Boyd 2004), in550
which both cooperative and defecting states can remain stable.
When the aforementioned cognitive mechanisms for weight-
ing costly displays are included as part of cultural learning,
belief–action combinations yield many different stable states,
including those in which the actions are individually costly,555
and potentially cooperative (Henrich 2009).
Existence of alternative stable sets of norms across hu-
man societies creates conditions in which competition among
groups will favor the emergence of prosocial norms—that is,
norms that lead to success in competition with other groups.560
The most important norms are likely to be those that increase
cooperation (e.g., in warfare and economic production) or re-
duce within-group conﬂict, by regulating sexual relationships
or managing disputes. Because this process involves competi-
tion among stable states, modeling shows that it does not suffer565
the challenges typically associated with the genetic group se-
lection of altruism (Boyd and Richerson 2002).
This process is capable of assembling those combina-
tions of supernatural beliefs, rituals, and devotions that most
reinforce cooperative or other prosocial norms. Religious el-570
ements can operate in at least four interrelated ways. First,
observation and participation in costly rituals are likely to in-
duce deep commitment to associated norms, leading to greater
intrinsic motivation to comply (Henrich 2009). Second, super-
natural policing and incentives (heaven vs. hell) can buttress575
more worldly norm-sustaining mechanisms, such as punish-
ment, signaling, and reputation (Gintis et al. 2001; Henrich
and Boyd 2001; Panchanathan and Boyd 2004). By augment-
ing these mechanisms, supernatural beliefs have culturally se-
lective advantages over purely secular mechanisms (Johnson 580
2005). At the margins, the additional psychological threat of
supernatural incentives reduces the costs of punishing viola-
tors, provides a threat when no human eyes are watching, and
may tilt the balance in situations when the beneﬁts of defecting
(charging a vast enemy) exceed the potential worldly costs. If 585
a transgressor has faith in divine awareness and retribution,
then external policing, capture, and punishment “automati-
cally” come from within. By reenforcing worldly mechanisms
where they are weak (e.g., monitoring large populations), su-
pernatural beliefs can help extend the scale and intensity of 590
cooperation. Third, when supernatural punishment is either
indiscriminate or collective, third parties have a direct incen-
tive to keep norm violators in line. If people believe that their
god will punish everyone (say, by a drought) for the misdeeds
of a few (e.g., adultery), then everyone has an incentive to keep 595
everyone else in line.
The fourth way religion can galvanize prosocial norms is
by making gods the authors of sacred canons or values that
authenticate society—in the minds of believers—as having
an existence above a mere aggregation of its individuals and 600
institutions (Durkheim 1995; Wilson 2002). Beyond simply
the authority of authorship, the ineffability of sacred “propo-
sitions” (e.g., “God is merciful to believers,” or “this land
is holy”) effectively places them beyond logical or empirical
scrutiny (Rappaport 1999). Recent work reveals that children’s 605
beliefs in God as the creator of everything favors essentializ-
ing of social categories, meaning that religious beliefs about
divine creators predict the inferring that ethnic/religious cat-
egory membership is stable (immutable: these effects seem
limited to human categories, and do not inﬂuence judgments 610
about artifacts or animals). This suggests that competition
among socioreligious groups will favor beliefs that galvanize
and reify group membership by extending our intuitive system
for essence-based inferences (used for thinking about biologi-
cal kinds; Atran 1998) to the relevant human social categories 615
(Diesendruck and Haber 2009). By sparking our tendency to
essentialize some categories (e.g., biological species), beliefs
in supernatural creators may facilitate (psychologically) the
uniﬁcation of diverse tribes into a single, stable, immutable
people, and God’s people. 620
The same evolutionary process will favor distinct markers
of group members, often in the form of taboos. These emerge
as nonnegotiable prohibitions about beliefs and behaviors that
systematically covary with sacred (less observable) beliefs and
values (Durkheim 1995; Wilson 2002). Punishment for trans- 625
gression of taboos provides concrete markers and proof of
the meaning and importance of what is sacred for a society.
Together, sacred values and taboos bound moral behavior at
the most basic level of conduct in society (sex, diet, dress,
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and greetings) and at the most general level (warfare, rule,630
work, and trade). Together with religious rituals, devotions,
and insignia, such practices can foster a cohesive group iden-
tity and increase solidarity vis-a`-vis other groups. Here reli-
gion exploits and extends our “tribal psychology” that has long
marked group boundaries through language, dialect, and dress635
(McElreath et al. 2003).
For example, the Hebrew Kingdom of Judah used cir-
cumcision, dietary laws, and a prohibition against work on the
Sabbath (etc.) as displays of commitment to their God. This
enabled the alliance of Hebrew tribes to set themselves apart640
from coastal peoples (e.g., Philistines, Canaanites) and forged
a uniﬁcation that withstood stronger invaders (e.g., Egyptians,
Babylonians) (Sweeney 2001). Violating the Sabbath, along
with idolatry, were considered the gravest violations and pun-
ishable by death (Phillips 1970). These were both costly and645
arbitrary markers of corporate identity relative to the concrete
needs of social life shared with other groups (in contrast to
prohibitions on stealing, adultery, murder, etc.). Disregard of
these was considered a reliable signal of sin and failure of
commitment. From this perspective, groups using such costly650
markers succeed because they (1) transmit commitment in the
next generation, (2) eliminate, or identify, those lacking suf-
ﬁcient commitment to the group and its god(s) (Irons 1996;
Sosis and Alcorta 2003), and (3) psychologically demarcate
the group in ways that engage our tendency to essentialize and655
reify group boundaries.
Norms are often attached to powerful emotions (anger,
guilt, shame) that can be ampliﬁed by certain religious be-
liefs into dread, awe, or anxiety. This leads to strong reactions
against norm violators that range from bad-mouthing to ban-660
ishment, and from manhandling to murder. Experiments show
that when norms are associated with the sacred, they become
emotionally charged and less inﬂuenced by material calcula-
tions and tradeoffs (Tetlock 2003). In conﬂict situations, as in
the Middle East, recent research reveals that material offers665
from one group to another proposing that norms associated
with sacred values be relaxed or abandoned generate moral
outrage, and increase people’s readiness to support lethal vio-
lence. Such sacred values appear to be somewhat immune to
the rationality of realpolitik or the marketplace, implying that670
a “business-like” approach to negotiations in conﬂicts involv-
ing sacred values may backﬁre (Atran et al. 2007; Ginges et al.
2007; Dehghani et al. 2009). From our perspective, increasing
the material incentives to a believer in exchange for violating
sacred values might result in substantial increasing of the sig-675
naling value obtained from rejecting the material payoffs. The
target of the signal might be God, one’s fellows, or one’s self.
The line sketched here allows some predictions about the
historical emergence of supernatural agents. Gods of increas-
ingly complex societies should evolve to be more concerned680
with (1) in-group cooperation (help your co-religionists),
harmony (no stealing, lying, or adultery), and fair exchange,
(2) sexual and family relations (increasing reproduction of new
adherents), and (3) the performance of commitment-inducing
rituals (Roes 1995; Roes and Raymond 2003; Johnson 2005). 685
To better police and reward adherents, the gods of emerging
complex societies need more knowledge of mortal behavior
(evolution of omniscience) and more power to reward and
punish (thus, an afterlife in heaven or hell). This allows gods
to monitor people in ephemeral or anonymous situations, and 690
to provide potent incentives, if they can instill deep commit-
ment. Along these lines, beliefs in an eternal, blissful afterlife
for the faithful emerged likely only after 500 B.C. in Eura-
sia, with the rise of cosmopolitan religions such as Hinduism,
Mahayana Buddhism, and Christianity (McNeil 1991). 695
The Religious Rise of Civilizations
Scholars have long suspected a link between certain religious
forms and the emergence of complex societies. In the 14th
century, historian Ibn Khalduˆn examined different waves of
invasion in the Maghreb and argued that enduring dynastic 700
power stems from religious “group feeling,” with its ability to
unite desires, inspire hearts, and support mutual cooperation
(Khalduˆn 2005). Historical work suggests that the beliefs, ritu-
als, and norms (e.g., inheritance rules, ethnic equality, judicial
procedures) of Islam spread initially by providing a means of 705
unifying the warring Arabic tribes, giving them the ability to
cooperate, conquer, and gradually assimilate surrounding peo-
ples (Levy 1957). Contemporary studies indicate that Islam
spread into Sub-Saharan Africa by drawing people into tighter
religiously based networks of trust that facilitate trade and eco- 710
nomic success (Ensminger 1997). As expected, this process is
galvanized by costly devotions and rituals (fasting, frequent
prayer, taboos on pork and alcohol) that demarcate believers
from everyone else. Similar considerations apply to the ongo-
ing spread of evangelical Protestantism in Asia, Africa, and 715
Latin America (Freston 2001).
The archaeological record reveals a clear, coevolution-
ary connection between religion, ritual, and complex soci-
eties. Recent ﬁnds indicate that rituals became much more
formal, elaborate, and costly as societies developed from for- 720
aging bands into chiefdoms and states (Marcus and Flannery
2004; cf Whitehouse 2004). In Mexico before 4000 B.P., for
example, nomadic bands relied on informal, unscheduled, and
inclusive rituals. The same goes for contemporary foragers,
such as the San of Africa’s Kalahari desert, whose ad-hoc rit- 725
uals (e.g., trance dancing) include all community members,
and are organized according to the contingencies of rainfall,
hunting, and illnesses (Lee 1979).
Then, with the establishment of permanent villages and
multi-village chiefdoms (4000–3000 B.P.), rituals are man- 730
aged by social achievers (prestigious “Big Men” and chiefs)
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and scheduled by solar and astral events. This also appears to
be the case for pre-dynastic Egypt (6000–5000 B.P.) and China
(4500–3500 B.P.), as well as for North American chiefdoms.
After the state was formed in Mexico (2500 B.P.), important735
rituals were performed by a class of full-time priests, sub-
sidized by society, using religious calendars and occupying
temples built at enormous costs in labor and lives. This is also
true for the earliest state-level societies of Mesopotamia (after
5500 B.P.) and India (after 4500 B.P.), which, as inMesoamer-740
ican, practiced fearsome human sacriﬁce (Campbell 1974).
Combining this with comparative ethnography suggests that
high moralizing gods likely coevolved with costly regularized
rituals, creating a mutually reenforcing cultural nexus capable
of enhancing internal cooperation and harmony, while provid-745
ing a justiﬁcation to exploit out-groups.
Combining these observations with recent work in psy-
chology illuminates a linkage between monumental architec-
ture and religion. The earliest civilizations are known for their
impressive monuments, usually in the form of temples, pyra-750
mids (tombs), and ziggurats (altars) that may have served
at least two important psychological purposes: (1) as costly
displays of commitment from the society’s leaders, or soci-
ety in general, they help to instill deeper commitments to
religious/group ideologies in learners; and (2) as “religious755
primes,” their visibility may stimulate prosocial behavior. As
noted, experiments show that believers give more money to
others and cheat less when primed with religious concepts; a
giant temple in the market square may provide a salient cue
that evokes, if only at the margins, more prosocial behavior.760
Societies that better exploit these aspects of our psychology
could outcompete others.
Cultural Group Selection
Our species’ heavy reliance on social learning spontaneously
gives rise to norms and informal institutions (stable equilib-765
ria), which vary in their group-level competitive properties.
Ecological and social pressures, especially with the spread of
agriculture, favor norms and institutions that strengthen and
extend the social spheres of cooperation and trust while sus-
taining internal harmony. Deep commitments to certain kinds770
of religious beliefs and practices can cement both adherence
to prosocial norms and a willingness to sanction norm viola-
tors, thereby increasing group solidarity and competitiveness
with other groups. Religious beliefs and practices, like group-
beneﬁcial norms, can spread by competition among social775
groups in several ways, including warfare, economic produc-
tion, and demographic expansion. Such cultural representa-
tions can also spread through more benign interactions, as
when members of one group preferentially acquire behaviors,
beliefs, and values from more successful groups.780
These processes of cultural group selection have both the-
oretical and empirical grounding. Theoretically, ﬁndings from
a growing literature of formalmodels of cultural evolution illu-
minate three important facts. First, nothing in the modeling of
these processes requires “essentializing” culture, nor do these 785
models assume away variation within groups. These models
permit within-group variation, and show that cultural group
selection can operate even in the face of ample within-group
variation (Boyd and Richerson 2002; Henrich 2004; Boyd et
al. 2003). Second, no assumptions about discrete or high ﬁ- 790
delity replication are required in models of cultural evolution,
and assuming that strong cognitive attractor exists do not ob-
viate the importance of other selective processes (Henrich and
Boyd 2002; Henrich et al. 2008). Third, important concerns AQ4
about older models involving the genetic group selection of 795
altruism do not apply to these cultural evolutionary models.
There are several reasons for this but three important ones re-
volve around: (1) the non-vertical nature of cultural inheritance
(Henrich and Boyd 2001), (2) the speed of cultural adaptation
(Boyd et al. n.d.), and (3) presence of multiple stable equilibria 800
(Henrich 2004).
Empirically, both detailed ethnographic studies and
historical analyses support the importance of cultural group
selection (see Henrich 2009 for additional cases). Ethno-
graphically, to illustrate cultural group selection both via the 805
emulation of more prestigious groups and direct economic
competition, consider the well-documented case of three
adjoining populations: the Itza’ Maya of Guatemala’s Pete´n
lowlands, Spanish-speaking Ladino immigrants from diverse
regions, and Q’eqchi Maya who arrived in clusters of families 810
and neighbors from the highlands (Atran et al. 2002). Among
the Itza’ Maya, one important predictor of sustainability is
their consensus on supernatural (as opposed to human) forest
preferences. This cultural consensus about which species are
most valuable and worthy of protection accords well with 815
the anthropogenic character of the forest in the Classic era of
Maya civilization. The researchers’ hypothesis is that spirit
preferences represent a summary of experience accumulated
over generations. Itza’ Maya believe spirits to be “guardians”
of the forest. Spirits help people who do not harm the survival 820
prospects of certain species (as spirits see those prospects).
Hurting the forest can result in accidents, illness, and worse
(punishment). This research team has witnessed Itza’, bitten
by deadly pit vipers, refuse to be taken for anticoagulant
treatment, until they venture into the forest to ask spirits 825
for guidance or forgiveness. It matters little if supernatural
threats are real or not: if people believe in them, threats of
punishment become real deterrents (Durkheim 1995).
Evidence indicates that much of this knowledge is being
transmitted to Ladinos. Experimental elicitations show that 830
Itza’ knowledge predicts relative success in short- and long-
term agroforestry. By attending to Itza’ models of behavioral
success in agroforestry, and to Itza’ stories that embed that be-
havior in context, prestigious Ladinos havemanaged to acquire
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a subset of Itza’ knowledge of the ecological relationships835
between humans, animals, and plants. Social network analysis
suggests how this knowledge and practice has spread through
the Ladino community. It seems the initial lack of any commu-
nal Ladino religion or corporate structures, combined with the
uncertainty created by immigration into a novel environment,840
made Ladinos open to learning from Itza’ (Sosis and Bressler
2003).
In contrast to Ladinos, migrant Q’eqchi, who have strong
and highly ritualized religious institutions, pay little heed to
Itza’. The Q’eqchi retain allegiances only to the spirits of845
their native highlands and have no knowledge of Itza’ beliefs.
Q’eqchi send delegations back to the highlands to consult
deities when they have agricultural troubles in the lowlands.
Q’eqchi’s mental models of the forest are correspondingly
poor, as are their associated agroforestry practices, which are850
commercially oriented and unsustainable.
These divergent beliefs mean that the Q’eqchi are now
spreading more rapidly than the other two groups. In fact,
Q’eqchi practices arewell adapted to present “open-commons”
conditions in Guatemala that encourage massive immigration855
from the overcrowded highlands into the ecologically fragile
lowlands. There is little incentive to avoid destructive prac-
tices: if one part of the forest is destroyed, Q’eqchi simply mi-
grate. In this context, Itza’ practices are currently maladaptive.
By making costly commitments to preserve the forest, Itza’860
make it easier for the highly ritualized, corporately disciplined
Q’eqchi to exploit it. Thus, Itza’ may be subsidizing their own
cultural extinction in the competition among ethnic groups.
Historically, the impact of the cultural group selection
on the interrelationship between religious beliefs and costly865
rituals/devotions is apparent in a study of 83 utopian com-
munes in the 19th century (Sosis and Bressler 2003). Reli-
gious groups with more costly rituals were more likely to
survive over time than religious groups with fewer costly ritu-
als. Differential group survival yielded an increase in the mean870
number of costly rituals per group over time. The above the-
ory and evidence suggest that such rituals and devotions likely
generated greater commitment and solidarity within groups
(Henrich 2009). Indeed, members and leaders explicitly ac-
knowledged that costly demands increasedmembers’ religious875
commitment (Sosis and Bressler 2003).
The relation of rituals to prosocial behavior toward in-
group members is demonstrated in a variety of ways. Among
Israeli kibbutzim (cooperatives), individuals from religious
kibbutzim cooperated more in behavioral experiments than880
those from nonreligious ones, with increased cooperativeness
of religious members attributed to greater ritual participation
(Rufﬂe and Sosis 2006). Religious kibbutzim also econom-
ically outperform secular ones (Fishman and Goldschmidt
1990; Rufﬂe and Sosis 2006). Surveys of Palestinians and Is-885
raeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza reveal that a person’s
frequency of attendance at religious services predicts support
for martyrdom missions. This relation is independent of time
spent in prayer. Similar ﬁndings emerge for representative
samples of religious Indians, Russians, Mexicans, British, and 890
Indonesians: Greater ritual attendance predicts both declared
willingness to die for one’s deities, and belief that other re-
ligions are responsible for problems in the world (Ginges et
al. 2009). Finally, a study of 60 small-scale societies reveals
that males from groups in the most competitive socioecologies 895
(with frequent warfare) endure the costliest rites (genital muti-
lation, scariﬁcation, etc.), which “ritually signal commitment
and promote solidarity among males who must organize for
warfare” (Sosis et al. 2007).
Cultural group selection shapes religious beliefs and rites 900
to manipulate our psychology to increase solidarity and com-
mitment. Such patterns, observed across history and in the
anthropological record, reemerge in today’s terrorist groups
(Atran 2003). Even avowedly secular national and transna-
tionalmovements retainmany agentive (anthropomorphic) and 905
transcendental (sacred) aspects of traditional religions (An-
derson 1991): nations ritually mourn, rejoice, and demand
sacriﬁce, and the “naturalness” of causes that defy prior hu-
man history (universal justice, equality, and liberty) is any-
thing but empirically or logically self-evident (Atran 2010). As 910
we argue that sociopolitical complexity coevolved with both
commitment-inducing rituals and beliefs in high moralizing
gods, our efforts also dovetail with recent work indicating that
cultural group selection, driven by differences in sociopolitical
complexity, is crucial to understanding the global distribution 915
and diversity of languages (Currie and Mace 2009).
In sum, religion, as an interwoven complex of rituals, be-
liefs, and norms, plausibly arises from a combination of (1) the
mnemonic power of counterintuitive representations, (2) our
evolved willingness to put faith on culturally acquired beliefs 920
rooted in the commitment-inducing power of devotions and
rituals, and (3) the selective effect on particular cultural com-
plexes created by competition among societies and institutions.
None of these evolved for religion per se. Themnemonic power
of minimally counterintuitive representations appears to be a 925
by-product of our evolved expectations about how the world
works and our ﬁtness-enhancing requirement to pay attention
to anomalies. The faith we sometimes place in culture over
our own experience and intuitions is a cognitive adaptation,
resulting from our long dependence on vast bodies of complex 930
cultural knowledge. Reliance on costly displays evolved to
provide partial immunity against manipulation. The power of
rhythm and synchrony in ritual to build solidarity (Wiltermuth
and Heath 2009) likely arises from our imitative and ToM abil-
ities. Cultural evolution, driven by competition among groups, 935
exploits each of these cognitive processes to fashion sets of
counterintuitive beliefs, rituals, and norms that spread by inter-
group transmission, conquest, or reproductive differentials. As
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a result, for large-scale societies, these complexes tend to in-
clude potent supernatural agents that monitor and incentivize940
actions that expand the sphere of cooperation, galvanize soli-
darity in response to external threats, deepen faith, and sustain
internal harmony.
Signiﬁcant advances in the study of religious cognition,
the transmission of culture, and the evolution of cooperation945
are all relatively recent. Bringing these new insights, in com-
bination with older ideas, to bear on phenomena as complex
as moralizing religions and large-scale societies will be an on-
going challenge. The argument and evidence presented here
provides a plausible scenario showing how synthetic progress950
is possible. More rigorous study is needed on the evolved
psychology and cultural processes associated with the role
of counterintuitive agents and costly rituals in scaling up the
scope of trust and exchange of sacred values and taboos in
sustaining large-scale cooperation against external threats, and955
also of maintaining social and political causes that defy self-
interest. Empirical research that combines in-depth ethnog-
raphy with both cognitive and behavior experiments among
diverse societies, including those lacking a world religion, is
crucial to understanding how religion inﬂuences our cogni-960
tion, decision-making, and judgments. The formal modeling
of cultural evolutionary processes should be combined with
historical and archeological efforts to apply these emerging
insights to broad patterns of history. These joint efforts should
further illuminate the origins and development of religions,965
and the cooperation and conﬂicts they engender. There may
be no more urgent study needed in the world today.
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